Wednesday, October 19, 2005

Revelation or Testemony?

Which concept better describes the Bible? For me, "revelation" evokes the qualities of eternal, timeless, objective, fixed, and abstract. "Testimony" on the other hand evokes the qaulities of past, involved, and presently relevant.

I have been pondering the notion of testimony lately, not just in regard to historiography, but also in regard to the picture we have of the Bible and what we should use it for. I think that it is time we reclaimed the 'Old and New Testaments' as testaments, that is, we see them as giving witness to God and his people. It witnesses to God's actions, peoples responses, his overarching plan for creation and our place within that plan.

For me, history is our playing field, and it only makes sense that any knowledge worth our knowing will be concerned with history and not those things that do not intersect with it. Of course the God of the Bible is not the God of the philososhers, he is not the uninvolved Deist God that reasoning produces. No, the God of the Bible is seen and understood because he does get involved in his creation, deeply involved. We do not have knowledge about God because he has given us a textbook, but because we have testimony to his past involvement (both words and actions) in which we can see what he is like. The Bible is not eternal and timeless, rather it developed over time. It is not objective or abstract, but embodies human perspectives as testimony and witnesses to historical happenings.

I think that the concept of "revelation" is unhelpful, atleast for me. Testament is far more accurate.

Friday, October 07, 2005

The Historians Reliance upon Testimony

I will be doing a series of short posts on testimony and history. The first of these concerns the nature of testimony, and the historians reliance upon it.

Testimony is report of past happening, whether written, pictorial, or oral. There is testimony from people of the past about their own past, testimony from people of the past about the past of others, and likewise, testimony from people in the present about their own past, or about the past of others.

Now inasmuch as the historian wishes to say something about past happenings of which he/she was not involved, they have to rely upon the testimony others. Besides this, all that remains for the historian is unbridled creativity, or what some refer to as wild speculation. Thus, Provan writes that “history is fundamentally openness to acceptance of accounts from the past that enshrine other people’s memories.”[1] Without these ‘accounts from the past’, we have no means of finding out about the happenings of the past. [2] Because of his, Iain Provan suggests that the language of "knowledge" can be somewhat misleading:
“What is commonly referred to as knowledge of the past is more accurately described as faith in the testimony, in the interpretations of the past, offered by others. We consider the gathered testimonies at our disposal; we reflect on the various interpretations offered; and we decide in various ways and to various extents to invest faith in these – to make these testimonies and interpretations our own.” [3]

The second point, that testimony is interpretation, is of great significance. Because of the nature of its referent (the temporal flow of past happenings), testimony always takes the form of a narrative. It can thus be considered ‘story telling’. This highlights an important point about testimony, it always involves interpretation. The selection of what is told, the way it is told, and the explanations given regarding the relationships between events and their meaning, are all aspects of interpretation and are inevitable features of testimony. All testimony proceeds from people and is therefore told from a certain perspective or point of view, that is, given an interpretation.

But the task of the historian is more than deciding between interpretations. He/she may wish to offer an alternative interpretation to all those offered. Further, many historians see their task as that of establishing what actually happened with some sort of proof. Thus they take to the tasks of 'validation' (when a text is judged to represent historical events accurately) and 'reconstruction' (when it is not). This is what I will explore in my next post.

[1] Provan, "Knowing and Believing: Faith in the Past", 249, in Bartholomew (ed.) 'Behind the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation (Cumbria: Paternoster, 2003), 229-266
[2] Archaelogy may be seen as an exception. But archaelogy can tell us very little about events unless it is brought into correspondence with testimony. see ibid., 247-49
[3] ibid., 246

Friday, September 30, 2005

Foundations and Historical Criticism

Should the term “critical” be reserved for the area of biblical studies that seeks to determine the truthfulness or historicity of the biblical witness? Thus, to be critical is being critical of the primary sources. Or, as I suggested below, should ‘being critical’ also include being critical of secondary sources of explanation?

Mary E. Healy makes the distinction between ‘historical criticism’ and ‘historical-critical methods’. The former consists in breaking down the text and reconstructing history from a new standpoint, the latter concerns understanding the text, including history from its standpoint.[1]

Concerning the standpoint from which historical criticism (as she classifies it) approaches its task, we may question what privileges its standpoint over that of the Evangelists, if they were indeed concerned with the past. The foundational assumptions of the discipline are open to debate, that is, the supposed “findings of modernity” upon which the discipline stands are by no means ‘assured’, as consensus has not been reached within their respective fields of origin (e.g. does science rule out the possibility of miracles).

Thus, we should not, as a matter of fact, view the Evangelists as naïve in believing that Jesus performed miracle,[2] whereas from our vantage point we know better. We could do so of course, depending upon our standpoint concerning this matter. But we cannot make this the standpoint for academic or “critical” scholarship. In as much as some sort of shared perspective is required between scholars for fruitful dialogue and investigation to take place, I do not think that naturalism should constitute part of this shared perspective. Firstly, it dismisses too much data, data that is central to most of the biblical narratives.[3] Secondly, it would need to be demonstrated that naturalist assumptions lead to the most accurate results.

It must be affirmed that both miracles and the resurrection pose real problems for historians of any standpoint. How would one go about investigating whether in a given instance they occurred or not? A historian that believes miracles to be impossible (for what ever reason) need not enter such an investigation. What they would do however is investigate an alternative explanation for the historical consequences the gospel material.[4] But a historian who brings no such assumption to the historical critical task (that of reconstructing history from their standpoint; historical criticism) will not be able to avoid the investigation. What they must do is test the written testimony (‘can it be trusted?’), and this can be done along many lines. The results of this will be decisive, not any prior convictions.


[1] Mary E. Healy, “Behind, in Front of .. or Through the Text? The Christological Analogy and the Lost World of Biblical Truth”, 187, in Bartholomew, C. G., Evans, S. C., Healy, M., Rae, M., editors, ‘Behind’ the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation (Cumbria: Paternoster, 2003), 181-95. We must be upfront about the fact that all history is done from a standpoint that is constituted by certain assumptions about the world and reality in general. So she comments, “The idea of an absolutely neutral observer standing on some plane outside the repercussions of history, able to judge interpretations of the past with impartial certitude, is as mythical as the Gnostic ‘Primal Man’.” (184)

[2] Or more accurately, God performed miracles through Jesus.

[3] e.g. miracles and exorcisms to the gospels. To dismiss these would be to rule out a large and significant chunk of the material we have to work with.

[4] This may be explored on along two avenues. The first being textual (is it simply authorial/communal invention), the second being actual (some “natural” explanation for the event).

Thursday, September 29, 2005

One Criteria for All? Word and Resurrection under the microscope

One of the points James and Rafael are discussing (as an example for a larger question I think) is whether the resurrection should be judged on the same grounds as the teachings ascribed to Jesus. I, with Rafael (see his posts), would maintain a distinction between the resurrection and sayings of Jesus in terms of assessing probable historicity. I hope I can add some clarity to the issue (although I doubt it) if any is needed.

Both Jesus' words and his resurrectionare come to us in written traditions concerned with actual happenings in Jesus life, and in this regard they are on the same level. But they do concern different happenings, and it is the possibility of these happenings which has the first say concerning historicity. Only then does probability come into play concerning whether they actually happened in a given instance.

Thus, although we are dealing with two written testimonies, this 'written' factor is put to one side for the initial judgement. This judgment works as an assumption for the discerning of probability. So, in one tradition it is claimed that Jesus speaks, in the other, that God raises Jesus to new life following his death. Most would have no trouble assuming that Jesus could speak. Many, however, would have trouble assuming that God could raise Jesus from the dead, primarily because they dont think that there is a God to do so (and if they did, some would still deny that he could "intervene" in the world like this).

Having made this initial assumption (usually sub-consciously), one would then go on to determine the probability of Jesus speaking and whether the particular tradition reflects what he actually said (the degree would range from exact replication to fiction). This stage is where one engages with the actuall text. For the second tradition, if one works with the assumption that there is a God, then one then goes about determining whether he probably did raise Jesus from the dead or not working with the evidence found in the written tradition.[1] If one assumes there is not, then one still needs to deal with the written tradition, but deems it inaccurate from the start, with no amount of argument to the contrary (concerning the written tradition) able to pursuade otherwise.


[1] Is it a reliable testimony? Given what we can establish about 'God', is it likely that he would raise Jesus? What reasons would he have for doing so?

Being Critical, the discussion continues

In his continuing dialogue with James Crossley, Rafael Rodriguez has made these important comments:
"I think critical scholarship would be well served by shifting its focus to the process of biblical historiography rather than its product."
Although I previously commented that being critical should not correspond to always being skeptical, I think Rafael adds something important here. In discussion, the term "critical" is often used to categorize a certain group of scholars or the results which define this category ('critical' scholarship' over 'against conservative scholarship'). The results that fit this category are usually minimalist and reflect skepticism towards the hiistorical value of biblical narratives. In aligning "ciritical" with these results, we have made the mistake that the lecturers at my Bible college try to rule out at the very beginning of semesters, that being critical does not simply mean being dismissive. It means thinking through arguments and making informed judgements.
"But, a preference for certain sources can be the result of critical reflection (granted that, nevertheless, it frequently isn't)."
This statement coheres with what I tried to establish in my previous post, and I'd appreciate to hear your comments on it Rafael! The discussion continues and I suggest all interested check out the full posts at Rafael and James, as well as Michael Bird's blogs.

Wednesday, September 28, 2005

What Does it Mean to "Be Critical" in Studying the Historical Jesus

In the hope of sparking some discussion over the issue, i have decided to pose the question:

What does it mean to be "critical" in histoical Jesus studies and biblical studies in general?

The major issue I see here, and which has called fourth this post, is the question whether, to be "critical" do we need to assume a "skeptical" stance towards the texts and/or the authors? Does this mean assuming historical innaccuracy? If so, do we need concrete reasons for doing so? This may, although not necessarily, concerns the issue of burden of proof.

When I think of being critical, i think in terms of not being immediately trusting of ones own or anothers understanding, but testing its truthfulness or accuracy. When this comes to studying the historical Jesus, this works on two fronts: (1) testing my own and others interpretations of the primary data (directly concerning Jesus [e.g. gospels] and background data [e.g. other Jewish Literature]), (2) testing the primary data for its truthfulness or accuracy. Both of these are vital, the circumstances surrounding the latter, however, make it a tenuous task with tentative results.

How to go about the latter, which should of course be done first, is what concerns me the most. Inasmuch as being critical means not being immediately trusting, but testing, there are many reasons that suggest this process should not be taken when approaching each and every individual tradition concerning Jesus.[1] If one wishes to assume a stance of either trust or distrust towards the traditions (in terms of historical value) before testing them, one must have reasons to do so. And what I would argue is that we should take a stance of trust towards the individual traditions in the canonical gospels. But this is a stance we should take subsequent to the first stance of not being immediately trusting, but testing. This may be clearer if I outline it in the following steps:
  1. Our default stance is "critical", in that we do not immediately trust or distrust our sources (as wholes), but we "test" them.
  2. The results of our testing lead us either to a stance of general trust towards each source as a whole (e.g. the gospel of Mark), or one of general distrust.
  3. If distrust, then certain criteria need to be employed to establish the probable accuracy or authenticity of each individual tradition before it can be used in reconstructing the Jesus of the past. But if trust is established as the general stance towards a source, then the criteria need not be employed for reconstruction to take place.
Now it should be questioned what justifies the claim that we should first determine whether to trust/distrust the sources as wholes (i.e. a gospel), rather than the normal approach of judging each individal tradition indipendently. Firstly, the latter approach assumes an answer to the former, whether recognized or not. The criteria of authenticity assume various things about early Christianity, the transmission of traditions about Jesus, and hence the nature of the canonical gospels in terms of their composition, purpose, genre, etc. In using the criteria then, one is working according to these assumptions whether one desires to or not, for they undergird the criteria.[2] What I suggest, is that many of the judgments that undergird the criteria are false.[3] Building upon more probable positions concerning early Christianity, transmission of traditions, and the nature of the canonical gospels, I suggest that we may take a stance of general trust towards the gospels, and hence the individual traditions they contain.

Thus, we are being "critical", but not aligning this with extreme skepticism or distrust. It is helpful to see it in terms of an activity rather than a stance.

The objection may also be raised that there is no middle position between "trust" and "distrust", and that to test something is to betray a "distrust" for it. I do wish to suggest a middle position however, because I want to make a distinction between two stages in the process, and reserve the terms trust and distrust for the second stage.


[1] The seperating of the present tradition (i.e. each gospel) into smaller ones (i.e. sayings, events) of course reflects the conclusions regarding questions of composition and transmission.
[2] Stanley Porter points out how the efforts to develop the "criteria of authenticity" corresponded with the growth of form criticism which is on the demise for good reasons. ("Reading the Gospels and the Quest for the Historical Jesus", 35, 49-50, 53, in Porter, Reading the Gospels Today (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 27-55)
[3] One should consult both Bauckham, The Gospels for All Christians, and Lemcio, The Past of Jesus in the Gospels, as well as Porter (ed.) Reading the Gospels Today. Particularly, McDonalds essay, "The Gospels in Early Christianity: Their Origin, Use, and Authrotiy", 150-178

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Diversity and Contradiction in the Bible

Some quarters of biblical scholarship have exaggerated supposed contradiction and diversity within both the Old and New Testaments. Much of the diversity however does not amount to mutual opposition. Nevertheless, genuine contradictions do occur. Given this emphasis placed upon diversity and contradiction in recent scholarship, John Goldingay provides a helpful and revealing analysis of the "degrees of diversity and forms of contradiction" in the Old Testament. He outlines a four-fold typlogy:[1]

  • Formal Contradiction - "Formal contradiction involves a difference at the level of words which is not a difference at the level of substance." (16)
  • Contextual Contradiction - "Contextual contradiction denotes a difference reflecting the variety in circumstances which different statements address." (19)
  • Substantial Contradiction - "Substantial contradiction involves a true divergence in viewpoint on the part of the speakers whose disagreement is neither merely verbal nor merely contextual." (21)
  • Fundamental Contradiction - "Fundamental Contradition denotes a dissagreement which is a matter of substance and which indicates a basic disharmony at the level of "ethical stance" or "religious outlook"." (24)

Much of the evidence for contradiction marshalled by scholars falls in the first two categories. However, all of them occur in the Old Testament.

[1] Theological Diversity and the Authority of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 15-25

bible as literature -quote-

To read the Bible as literature is not to refuse to take it seriously as a revelation of God's action in history. that would be to miss the whole point of the book.

T. B. Wright, Theology and Literature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 41-22

Exegesis as Self-Criticism

Exegesis as self-criticism consiously focuses on the reader before it focuses on the text. Because knowledge (and hence understanding of texts), although concerned with objects external to the knower (e.g. texts) is never independent of the knower (it is part of their cognitive framework), the discipline of testing knowledge is first and foremost an exercise in self-criticism.

Thus, this appraoch would begin with the readers intial or current interpretation of a text and then ask questions of the origin, justification, and correctness of it. The reader will ask: Why do I read it this way? and may take a sceptical stance towards their reading, Why is may reading wrong? The reader will examine their logic and judgements, how their emotions and commitments (theological and institutional) may impinge on these, and their knowledge base of the various contexts related to the text.

In the process of questioning the self and the interpretation, the text is examined in all of its contexts (linguistic, historical, etc.) and adjustements are made to the intial interpretation, or it is abandoned altogether and replaced with another. Although the task may seem an overly negative one, the postive side is the response to the findings. Thus, for example, if knowledge of a particular context is found to be lacking, then positive accumilation needs to take place. The reader therefore tests their interpretation by means of the text's various contexts, and the readers various contexts.

This approach acknowledges the role presuppositions play in reading and is conscious of the reception history of texts. One does not read in isolation, either from previous readings (reception history) or from ones own knowledge base and framework. not all presuppositions are hidenrances of cource, as all knowledge constitutes presupposition and factors in interpretation.

I suggest this because as I percieve the state of interpretation in current biblical studies, although the role of presuppositions are acknowledged, they are rarely factored into the intepretive process. Although one cannot "step out of them" and into another set, one can become aware of them and the affect they may have or be having on ones interpretation of a given text. Talk of them being inescapable therefore lets just ignore them honestly frustrates me.

blog role update

I have added a new blog to my bogroll. It is called Verily Verily: A place for my public musings re: what it means to remember Jesus within a community of faith and a community of scholarship, and is the work of Rafael Rodriguez. Both his subtitle, and his "maiden post" have grabbed my interest.
Welcome to my blog. I'll occasionally post thoughts pertaining to my own research (social memory theory, healings/exorcisms traditions in the synoptics, and historical Jesus research), current events/cultural phenomena, and the various discussions in other blogs I frequent. Feel free to leave comments as you feel inclined.
Well worth a look. The last two blogs discuss the idea of authenticity in historical Jesus study. And he references my recent post on the topic, how flattering!

Friday, September 16, 2005

Historical Interest and the Criteria of Authenticity

There are two assumptions that make the criteria of authenticity appear productive as a tool:[1] (1) The authors[2] of the gospels were uninterested in the actual happenings of Jesus life, deeming them irrelevant for their beliefs about him, or (2) the evangelists were poor historians, unreliable in the task of inquiry and presentation.

The first of these stands in contrast to the available evidence we possess concerning early Christian belief.[3] This can be quite clearly seen from passages such as 1 Cor 15, where the actuality of Jesus death and being raised back to life is foundational to the Christian hope.[4] In the opening verses to Luke’s gospel, he expresses his concern for the truth concerning Jesus (Luke 1.1-4). If the gospels embodied the conviction that Jesus actual words and actions were irrelevant in fiction, then it follows that the earliest Christian communities felt likewise, otherwise it is highly improbable that the gospel would ever have gained such a standing within the church as narratives concerning Jesus life. Indeed, they might be considered an insult?

The second assumption is unduly sceptical. Although it may gain strength from the variations[5] between the gospels, the solution seems rather to be that such variations were of no concern to the evangelists. Nevertheless, accepting that the evangelists were interested in the actual happenings of Jesus life, the second assumption assumes that they nevertheless did a poor job in gathering and presenting accurate information. In other words, they did poor history and have distorted the past as a result. The next move is then to purge the sources of inaccuracy by establishing, through the use of the "criteria of authenticity" (or at list indicate probability), what words recorded in the gospels actually came from Jesus lips (or his opponents?), or represent his words accurately,[6] and what actions he actually performed (and his opponents?). And more subtly, establishing the "original form" of these words, the actions, and the settings they most likely occurred in, given the redactional work of the evangelists and possibly the effects of oral memory, transmission, and performance upon the traditions.[7]

But working with the opposite assumption, we can see how the criteria for authenticity are of no real value for historical reconstruction. Upon examination of the criteria, we can see that the evangelists would have been in a far better position to employ them than any historian centuries removed.[8] The criteria of plausibility suggests that Jesus both fits somewhere within the variegated Judaism of the Second Temple period, and somewhere within earliest Christianity, that is, he reflects elements of continuity (and discontinuity) with both. There must be a level of continuity on both sides for a picture of Jesus to be plausible on a macro level. This criterion is also applied on a micro level, to the words placed on the lips of Jesus. Living within both the world of first-century Judaism and earliest Christianity, the evangelists would likely possess a superior understanding of both their Jewish and Christian neighbours, and so be at a far more advantageous position to test the sources by this criteria.[9] Hence it would be fair to assume that none of the material can be ruled out on the grounds that it is foreign in this respect, they would have picked up on something so out of place.

The criteria of multiple attestation is the test of whether a saying occurs in multiple sources or in multiple forms within the same or different sources. Thus, a saying is more likely authentic if it occurs in more than one of the gospels (and other early literature). The evangelists too, may have employed this criterion to their sources (whether written, but most likely received orally from people). This raises the possibility that although they have not cited their sources, they would not have made use of a saying which could not be verified by more than one source.[10] This could leave our employment of the criteria redundant and unnecessary as the job has been done at an earlier level much more effectively.

Further, whether we have any real hope of establishing the "original" or most accurate wording, setting, or place within the chronology of Jesus ministry for any one saying/event that we desire to have, and which the gospel producers were seemingly not interested in having, is highly doubtful.

If what I have argued above is correct, and the early Christians, including the producers of the gospels, were interested in the actual happenings of Jesus life to the degree that their religion was built upon them, then we can only assume that in their quest to stand true to this they did what they could to make sure of the reliability of their written testimony. We should not ascribe to them an undue gullibility, nor should we think the criteria to be too sophisticated for them, as they are obviously very simple. We are on no better grounds (in fact worse) than they were for verifying the actual words and actions of Jesus, or their settings.

The conviction that the producers of the gospels were either uninterested in the actual happenings of Jesus life and deemed them of no significance for their beliefs concerning Jesus is built not upon evidence but on an undue scepticism about the abilities or motives of the authors of the gospels and the early Christians. Consequently, the criteria of authenticity are of little value for establishing either authenticity or probable authenticity. I suppose we just need to be more trusting...

This is largely an experiment in thought and rests on establishing the early Christian conviction that their religion is rooted in history and that Jesus as he actually was is their Lord. I would appreciate your comments and criticisms.


[1] One holds either one or the other.

[2] I use the phrase “author” as a simple label without making any judgements about whether there are only one author behind each gospel.

[3] That the producers of the gospels were different in this account, and that they some how produced largely fictional works which came to be understood as historical, is unlikely, and requires some form of evidence. The simple possibility of it occurring, does not warrant us thinking that it did in the face of evidence to the contrary.

[4] That this is not simply "Paul’s thing" is clear from the fact that he appeals to it as established tradition, witnessed to by those at the heart of Christian movement from the beginning (vv.3-7). This passage of course says nothing of Jesus words and actions during his initial life. See Michael Birds blog entry, Jim West and Interest in the Historical Jesus.

[5] The variations are of three basic types: wording, narrative placement, and setting.

[6] There are other criteria than the two examples mentioned below, see John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew vol.1. But the criteria of embarrassment for instance, as a purely positive criteria does not interest us. Still, a similar line of argument as applied to the two examples could follow. as being closest to the beliefs of the earliest Christians, the producers of the Gospels would be in a better position to observe what saying or actions would have actually caused difficulty or embarrassment for them, sayings or actions we may not pick up on from our perspective.

[7] These are evidenced by the variations in wording, setting, and order of the telling of the purportedly single events between the gospels.

[8] I prefer the term "teachings" here over "words" because of the distinction between ispsissima verba and ipsissima vox noted above. By “teachings” I mean to refer to all of the words ascribed to Jesus in the written sources.

[9] Even if they were unaware of all the writings of the Pseudepigrapha or those found at Qumran

[10] If a saying came from some one who claimed to be an eye witness, then if the gospel producer was satisfied by some means of criteria that they were indeed, then multiple sources may have been deemed unnecessary.

John and Jesus Making History

Fllowing some recent blogging on the value of John's gospel for the study of the historical Jesus (Euangelion, Primal Subversion), I have decided to delve into the issue myself. I think the best way to start would be to understand the gospel itself, and only then ask secondary questions such as its value as a source for studying the historical Jesus. [1]

So, I have decided to do some research into the exegetical methods used in the study of John's gospel, beggining with Narrative Criticism. Following investigation into these methods I will then apply them with the due caution, and see what I find. Then, finally I will offer some suggestions concerning the fourth gospel as a source for the Jesus of history.

[1] In as much as the study of the historical Jesus is a study of his memory recorded in literature, the historian cannot simply skip over sources such as John's gospel, but must consider them all, even if the result is to deem them unhelpful as a source because they are not concerned with actual happenings or because they are too "artistic" in their representation. Nothing is irrelevant, as we are dealing with perceptions of Jesus, that is, Jesus remembered. The phrase "Jesus remembered" of course is Dunn's

Tuesday, September 13, 2005

If Not Pragmatism, What else?

My previous quote has got me thinking. The quote is concerned with ministry on a university campus. My questions is, how much instruction have we actually recieved from God on doing ministry? By ministry I mean all that could be encompased by the word mission, that is, making disciples of everyone everywhere.

I think that to be a disciple is to be on the journey of growing to love God and love others more and more.[1] The activities that the disciple then does serve this end and include studying the scriptures, being prayed for, praying for and praying with others, telling others the goodnews about Jesus and the kingdom, looking out for peoples needs and seeing that they are taken care of.

Our official ministries (church and para-church if one is willing to make the distinction at a practical or theological level) are then to be shaped to this end, to facilitate the above. But as I asked, how much instruction have we actually recieved from God on doing this? What we see in the NT is a contextual outworking of God's purposes and will. It is an example of how to embody his purposes faithfully. I think our task is to do the same, taking these examples as suggestive guides and tests for whether our embodiment is indeed faithful to God's purposes. Hence context will play a large factor, and so this translates into being contextually pragmatic. The NT has nothing about mission on a university campus, thats our field of creative embodyment.

The real problem I think arises when we misunderstand our mission. For example, if we think our task is to convert as many people as we can, then we may seek to fill our churche services with as many people as we can so that they can hear the truth. We then shape our church services according to the best way to do this, we are pragmatic about it.

When it comes down to it, what God is seeking is transformed lives in community. The only way this is going to come about in a real and lasting way is through the power of the Spirit constantly working among us. That is pragmatic! We must always "soak" our lives and ministries in prayer, sincerely seeking the Spirit's guidence. But when the voice does not whisper, we can only go with what works.

[1] See Scot McKnight, "The Jesus Creed: what is the focus of spiritual life?" Christian Century vol.121 issue.18

Monday, September 12, 2005

unpragmatic pragmatism -quote-

"Unprincipled pragmatism is in the end not only unfaithful, but also unpragamatic. We must be driven by what God calls us to do, not simply by what we think works, because God alone ultimately knows what works. We must trust him and follow his instructions."
Jenson, P. D. and Payne, T., "Church/Campus Connections: Model 1", 195, in Carson, D. A. (ed.), Telling the Truth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000) 195-205

Friday, August 26, 2005

Worldview and Justification

When it is recognized that systems of rationality belong to worldviews themselves (what is seen to be rational is determined by the beliefs of the worldview), then it is hard to see how one may justify holding one over the other, or arguing for one over another. Though it is still often seen this way (as the modern worldview is still alive and kicking), there is nothing that privileges a secular worldview, one governed by philosophical naturalism, over any other. A simple unawareness or lack of experience concerning the spiritual, coupled with a heavy does of naturalist biology, lends credibility to the naturalist worldview. But it need not be that we must take it as our starting point, as shaping our system of rationality, and then see if we can prove or justify the Christian worldview according to its canons.

Nevertheless, we still wish to affirm that holding the Christian worldview is not simply a choice we make, or the tradition we inherit from our ‘community’. It is the Christian contention that we have the truth and that it is not just another option among the sea options offered in our pluralist society.[1] We do not hold to it because it suites us, it is not simply our preference. But the Christian worldview is adopted because Jesus Christ bursts into our “worlds” and demands that we account for him.

Indeed, it is the ability of a given worldview to make sense of all of reality that confers on it justification over rival worldviews. The worldview is thus a ‘hypothesis’ concerning the world, and is verified along the lines of its ability to take in as much data as possible, and to make sense of it in a coherent, simple, and perhaps elegant way. If it is rather weak at the above, i.e. failing to account for some crucial data, or producing an explanation that although apparently coherent, is complex and "full of hoops", then we may suspect that it needs adjusting, or even abandoning altogether in favor of another which has less trouble with the above.[2] But if it achieves a sufficient degree of the above beyond that of rival worldviews, then it seems reasonable for one to hold to it, and to live by it.[3]

And so, as noted before, all worldviews must account for Jesus Christ, both on a historical level and on a personal one when one comes into contact with the Lord of the universe himself. This may mean, indeed it will mean the abandonment of the pior held worldview and the adoption of the new. For the gospel cannot be assimilated into any prior worldview (unless of course it is a Jewish one, such as with the first Christians) because it brings with it an entire account of God, humanity, the world, and history.


[1] Nor is it just another dish at the buffet of postmodernism where one can quite rightly pick and choose aspects of this and aspects of that, to create a personal belief system. Such activity often results in a lack of coherency, a quality that is demanded by for a good worldview. A worldview encompasses all as an interpretative framework, and so isn’t in the same category.

[2] I use the phrase “less trouble” because it is not hard to recognize that no system (worldview) will immediately be worked out to the degree that it clearly explains everything. This is not a problem however, because it is principally the “ultimate things” which are of direct concern for a worldview, and it is the “consequent beliefs” and so forth that do the rest of the explanatory work. Worldviews at their basic level are “broad brush”. The ability of the consequent beliefs to provide adequate explanation is vital however. But sometimes failure to do so may merely be the failure to work out appropriate consequent beliefs.

[3] One still has the problem of what amount of evidence constitutes proof or a sense of beyond reasonable doubt.

Thursday, August 25, 2005

Worldview - Draft # 1 (part 2)

The centrality of story

Human experience is inextricably tied to history, that is, we live out our lives along a continuous passage of time, readily distinguishable as past, present, and future. As such experience has a ‘narrative quality’. Although we can think in terms of prepositional beliefs, these abstractions find meaning only in relation to other beliefs. [1] This web of beliefs inevitably weaves a narrative, leading us back to where they began. We can never escape the narrative context of beliefs.

The narrative or ‘story’ element of a worldview is thus central. These stories or the story provides the answers for the questions that give explanation to the world and which give identity to the person. These answers are in turn come to historical and cultural expression in symbols, and give way to a general praxis, “a way-of-being-in-the-world”. Thus, stories themselves (as narratives), far from being mere child’s play, are “located, on the map of human knowing, at a more fundamental level than explicitly formulated beliefs, including theological beliefs,”[2] “stories are a basic constituent of human life.”[3]

These stories however must not be seen as unconnected myths, tales, or histories. Only a narrative that could take in ultimate events and realities such as the origin (or eternality) of the world and the reason for suffering and evil (although some systems deny evil or redefine it), would qualify as the narrative, the grand narrative or controlling story of a worldview. Those stories or the story that provide answers to the basic questions, in other words, stories that are told to make sense of the world and to give human life purpose, meaning, or sometimes a lack of it.

This idea of a grand narrative or controlling story (I will use the two inter-changeably) is central to what I propose in this paper. The controlling story through which Christians think and live cannot be that of any old worldview, it must be the controlling story found within the scriptures. It is the stories which I will/have argued form a set, which belong to one grand narrative, that the Christian must perceive the world and their selves according to. To some up this section, “Worldviews are thus the basic stuff of human existence, the lens through which the world is seen, the blueprint for how one should live in it, and above all the sense of identity and place which enables human beings to be what they are.”[4] Story finds the central place in this, and so it is to the bibles grand narrative (alternatively ‘biblical story’) that we must look.

[1] [events]This is true not only of events of significance but those of everyday mundane life. The event of pouring a cup of tea, for example, means something only in relation to a series of prior and subsequent actions. We understand such an action because we are familiar with the ‘stories’ of how tea is primarily for drinking and that a cup is primarily a means of assisting the act of drinking and not that of storing.

[2] People, 38

[3] People, 40

[4] ibid., 125

Worldview - Draft # 1 (part 1)

Here is the first draft of my section on worldview for my research paper. It must be remembered that the paper is only a measly 6000 words and so I am proposing a thesis concisely with little engagement with other positions, and little detailed discussion of any of my points. Nevertheless, its still fun and I would appreciate all the constructive criticism you guys can throw at me, from content to arrangment, flow, and wording. I will post it in two parts to make for easier reading.


Worldview
In this part I (1) define and outline the concept of worldview, and (2) discuss the centrality of ‘story’ to the concept of worldview, introducing the idea of a controlling story.

It has become popular both among evangelical academics and evangelical lay people, to brandy the term “Christian worldview”. I fear however that because of its great usage and the lack of clear definition that this has betrayed, the term has become somewhat unhelpful in popular discussion. Indeed I fear it has become a tool of oppression, a way of forcing beliefs and praxis upon Christians that is far from central to their faith, and which is often highly, and justifiably debatable. However, if defined clearly, the concept can be of great assistance. Hence I will outline a very clear and limited definition.

"Worldviews" are the presuppositional, normally pre-cognitive, framework through which we perceive external reality. Firstly, they are presuppositional. Worldviews as ‘belief systems’ are the taken for granted ‘facts’ about the world we live in. Thus when we enter dialogue about an issue (e.g. ecology), the beliefs that are constitutive of our worldview are assumed to be true, and built upon in the discussion. They constitute the perspective from which we look at the issue. Secondly, they are precognitive. They are rarely raised in dialogue because, being so central to our beliefs and being assumed to be true, we simply build upon them. Nor do we consciously seek to bring them to mind when we are ‘building upon them’, we simply make the move without any mental strain. And thirdly, worldviews are the framework through which we perceive reality. As a ‘belief system’, they form the beliefs most central to the interpretive process. It is through a worldview that we make sense of (interpret) the world.

The metaphor of “lenses” has popularly been employed to illustrate their function: we view the world through a particular set of lenses.[1] We do not look at the lenses themselves but through them onto the world, nor do we usually consider them but stare as if they don’t exist. Further, it is the color of the lenses that dictate how we perceive. In this sense they are presuppositional, pre-cognitive, and provide a perspective (worldview).[2]

In his insightful discussion of worldview, N. T. Wright outlines four elements to a worldview: (1) they provide the stories, particularly a controlling story, through which humans perceive reality, (2) these stories then provide the answers to a set of “basic questions that determine human existence” (who are we, where are we, what is wrong, what is the solution, what time is it?), (3) these beliefs are expressed in cultural symbols, and (4) give way to a praxis, “a way-of-being-in-the-world”.[3]

The beliefs that constitute part of a worldview concern the ultimate questions of life, those which all other intellectual and practical pursuits build upon. They are in this sense “foundational”, grounding and conferring justification on our thinking and living. They are not uninvolved beliefs however. They provide both an identity (who are we), and a general praxis (where are we, what is wrong, what is the solution, what time is it?).


[1] The illustration can be somewhat misleading, as worldviews cannot simply be “taken off” and exchanged for a moment, as a pair of lenses might be.

[2] It is both appropriate to speak of ‘perceiving’ and inappropriate to speak of simply ‘seeing’ because at a more fundamental level, worldviews are constitutive of the human person and hence human cognition. To extend the metaphor, we cannot use our eyes at all if we are not wearing lenses. Indeed, the lenses are our eyes. We might wish to speak of prescription lenses without which all is a blur, but when worn, things come into focus.

[3] The New Testament and the People of God, 124-5

Tuesday, August 23, 2005

the historical uniqueness of Christianity -quote-

"The uniqueness and the scandal of the Christian religion rests on the mediation of revelation through historical events. Christianity is not just a code for living or a philosophy of religion. It is rooted in real events of history. To some people this is scandalous because it means the truth of Christianity is inexplicably bound up with the truth of certain historical facts. And if those facts should be disproved, Christianity would be false. This, however, is what makes Christianity unique because, unlike other world religions, modern man has a means of actually verifying Christianity's truth by historical evidence.”


George E. Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection (Downers Grove: Eerdmans, 1975), quoted in Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up?: A Debate Between William Lane Craig and John Dominic Crossan (Baker, 1998), p. 24 [im not sure which book this page number is from...]

Letting the scriptures shape us

Another lenghty post, brace yourself...

“What one already believes tends to make one disposed to accept what agrees with it or to reject what conflicts with it” [1], such is the nature of understanding. We can only understand events and objects in relation to other events and objects. Thus when confronted with new sensory experience or cognitive information, we attempt to fit it into what we already believe, specifically about other events and objects we deem relevant. Understanding is ‘assimilation’; we assimilate new information into our already existing belief system in order to make sense of it. If however we find that the new piece of data cannot fit adequately within our prior understanding, it may be arrogantly rejected or it may call aspects of our prior understanding into question. It may have to be reshaped to make adequate sense of the new data.

If a new piece of information (including experience) does not agree with what I already believe, there are two moves I can make: (1) I can reject it as false, or (2) Accept it as true. If I make the first move, (a) I can either just plain reject it cause I don’t want to believe it, (b) reject it on the basis of my confidence in the strength of my prior beliefs, or (c) reject it because I believe it is a misunderstanding, this is effectively to deny that the aspect or passage in question is actually making a claim at all.

When it comes to an aspect to text such as the Bible, we must adjust the two moves slightly, (1) rejecting that is has a claim on me, and (2) accepting that it has a claim on me, and acting accordingly. The Christian who wishes to be guided and shaped by Scripture is not likely to reject a certain aspect it on the basis of (a) alone. One may call (b) in for support, but even to do this leaves questions unanswered and would be inadequate for someone who is strongly set on of living by the Bible. Thus option (c) appears to be the only adequate option.

There is however a fourth option when the Bible is concerned, (d) account for it within my already existing set of beliefs. For this all manner of hermeneutical or interpretive moves can be made. I may claim that God no longer requires this sort of action (e.g. OT purity regulations), possibly appealing to a subsequent passage. I may consider a command to be specific to a culture or a situation that is not the case for me now (e.g. Paul’s command that women not be permitted to speak in church), or that subsequent scientific findings have shown a belief or attitude to be grounded in misconception (e.g. commands against homosexual practice).

(c) is problematic however when (a) is the motivation behind it. I may simply select the interpretation of the passage that effectively neutralizes the threat it poses to my prior belief and action. The only solution to this is a transformation of my character and understanding of Scripture. I must develop intellectual integrity, a desire to live by truth and not settle with anything else, and I must not see Scripture as a “threat” to myself, but as a gracious gift designed to bless. (d) can also fall to the same problem as (c). Numerous hermeneutical strategies are invented to justify the rejection of aspects of Scripture.

The impetus of course does not always come from a desire to reject; findings from biblical studies have shown that previous interpretation have been mistaken, and that certain commands do seem to be closely tied to the cultural context. Much fruitful work has no doubt been produced because of a dislike for a particular aspect of Scripture, but for the Christian who seeks to be shaped and guided by Scripture, a dislike should never motivate one to reject it or explore different interpretations. Any hermeneutical strategy must be developed with the desire to be faithful to God and what he has given us in Scripture.

But we are not to make move (2) naively. We are not t accept everything in Scripture at its face value. We need the careful, honest work of interpretation to discover what is actually being said and desired. We must also develop hermeneutical strategies, a flat agreeing with everything it says and doing everything it says to do does not work, nor is it appropriate to the nature of Scripture. Thus move (2) can be made in two ways. (a) Unquestioningly assent to the action or belief, or (b) through careful exegetical and hermeneutical work, establish what is said and in what sense it has or has not a claim on us here today, in our situations and contexts.


Thursday, August 18, 2005

source critical dig -quote-

Biblical critics frequently assume, out of some dim preconception about the transmission of texts in “primitive” cultures, that the redactors were in the grip of a kind of manic tribal compulsion, driven again and again to include units of traditional material that made no connective sense, for reasons they themselves could not have explained.

Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (London, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981) p.20